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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Rather than replicate that which is already before the court in the briefing of the Idaho
Emergency Communications Commission and Ada County, the Idaho Association of Counties
("IAC") will rely upon and join in the statement of facts and course of proceedings set forth in
those entities' briefs.

II.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Does Idaho Code§ 31-4802(13)(d) apply to TracFone Wireless, Inc. ("TracFone")? In
other words, is TracFone a telecommunications provider that connects an individual having a
service address or place of primary use in Idaho to a public safety answering point ("PSAP") by
dialing 911?

III.
ARGUMENT

A.

Introduction.

Idaho's emergency communication systems do not pay for themselves. The demands of
the ever changing technologies, the demands of the public for instant access to a dispatcher in a
life-safety event, and the demands of the federal government regarding upgrading the systems
require that local governments, particularly counties, provide the equipment and personnel to
assure the public this access. However, the state of Idaho, as an entity, does not pay a penny
through its general fund for this. Many years ago, the Idaho legislature determined that the
financial burden for this massive project be placed on the counties of the state and its property
taxpayers. However, the legislature determined that each county population would have the
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opportunity to vote to impose a fee on telephones within the county to help partially pay for the
expense of the technology. Hence, the Emergency Communications Act was born in 1988. Title
31, Chapter 40, of the Idaho Code has been amended from time to time to meet changes in
telephone use. In 2003, cellular telephones were added to those entities subject to the county fee.
In 2007, the legislature upgraded the Idaho Code to include all providers, no matter how they
styled themselves or however they set up business in the state, as subject to the fee. By adding
subsection (d) to Idaho Code § 31-4802(13 ), to add "any other" provider that connects 911
callers to PSAPs to the remainder of the definitional statute, one would have thought that the
legislature covered the waterfront.

TracFone, however, has resisted, and, unlike all other

providers in the state, has fought tooth and claw against the notion that they are subject to the
fee.
But TracFone had a major problem. It wanted to avail itself of federal funding under the
Lifeline program (designed to provide 911 support to low income families) but it had to be
designated by the Idaho Public Utilities Commission ("PUC") as an eligible telecommunications
carrier. The PUC took the sensible view that it was not in the public interest to designate
TracFone as eligible when TracFone "refused" to pay the 911 fee under the state law. R. 000058.
After some litigation, TracFone and the PUC agreed that, among other things, TracFone
would file a declaratory judgment action in Fourth Judicial District Court in order to determine if
it fell under the Idaho Code definition of a provider subject to the fee. R.000061. If a district
court decision was rendered against TracFone, TracFone agreed to reimburse the state IECC "or
other agencies" the unpaid fee going backwards from January 1, 2011. If TracFone appealed the
district court ruling, it would be subject to losing its designation. R.000062.
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TracFone has gotten what it bargained for. The Fourth Judicial District Court on two
occasions has stated without doubt that TracFone is subject to the fee.

R.001028--001049;

R.001838-001858. Not liking the answer, it comes to this court asserting that the district court's
decisions are "tortured."

B.

Standard of Review.

The district court granted the counties' and the State's Motion for Summary Judgment,
and denied TracFone's Motion for Reconsideration, generally upholding its ruling on summary
judgment. "The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court." Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914
(2001). However, since TracFone's appeal challenges the district court's legal conclusions and
not the actual denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, it is submitted that the summary
judgment standard of review is appropriate. See, Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 2012
WL 246678 (Idaho).
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court utilizes the same standard as
the district court. Farmers National Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 855, 318
P.3d 622, 624 (2014). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P.
56(c). "Ifthere is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over which
this court exercises free review." Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., 147 Idaho
737,746,215 P.3d 457,466 (2009) (citations omitted).
Further, "[a]ppellate jurisdiction over an appeal from an interlocutory decision certified
under Rule 54(b) is limited to the rulings or orders certified by the district court." Taylor v. AJA
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Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552,574,261 P.3d 829,851 (2011). "Because of the nature ofan
interlocutory appeal, we address only the precise question that was presented to and decided by
the trial court." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 892, 265
P.3d 502, 505 (2011). "Interlocutory appeals should not be used to guide the lower court on
issues that have not yet been raised." Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, 621, 315 P.3d 798, 809
(2013).
C.

TracFone is Not Entitled to Taxpayer Status.

In beginning an analysis of Appellant's various arguments, it is worth starting with the
claim TracFone makes to the effect that it is subject to something of a lesser burden than those
ordinarily bringing an appeal before this court. This claim is based on the assumption that the
E9 l l fee is a tax, and that Appellant is due the consideration afforded taxpayers who challenge a
taxing authority. Citing Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1988), to
the effect that ambiguities in a tax statute must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer against the
taxing authority, and claiming that this understanding is "crucial to this appeal" (App. Br., p.10),
Appellant relies upon two documents issued by the state attorney general in 1989 and 1994.
It is submitted that Appellant's claim derails for several reasons. First, no appellate court

in Idaho has ever ruled on the subject. Neither did the district court below, nor has any other
district court in Idaho. Indeed, it was not even an issue presented to the district court below for
declaratory ruling. Because only precise questions presented to the district court are heard on
interlocutory appeals, the court should decline to assume the fee is a tax. See Verska v. Saint

Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 892, 265 P.3d 502, 505 (2011).

By

definition, the suggested Brewster burden shifting methodology is not before this court and
should not be applied as Appellant suggests.
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Second, the supposedly dispositive documents placed by TracFone in the record do not
support the proposition that it is settled law that the E9 l l fee is a tax. In fact, the 1989 opinion
by the attorney general's office, made in the context of whether or not the fee applied to the state,
was based upon a matter of first impression and was tentative. Grappling with how to describe
the fee ( stating that it had "characteristics of both a tax in lieu of property tax and an excise tax"),
R. 001660, the author of the opinion (fully acknowledging his hesitation) went on to state that
"if' the fee was a means of indirectly taxing public property, then the charges would be
unconstitutional. R. 001661. The author then went on to admit that Idaho Code § 31-4811 "does
not support the theory that the tax is imposed for the right or privilege to access 911 service."
Hence, it was probably not an excise tax.

R. 001661-001662.

Noting that the fee was

"something of a hybrid between a property and a privilege tax," it would be "somewhat difficult
to predict" how the matter would be treated by this court. R. 001662. The opinion finished by
stating the fee "was apparently intended as an alternative to property taxes which public entities
are prohibited from paying. Consequently, it would likely be held that public entities are
prohibited from paying." R. 001662.
The 1994 document is not an official opinion of the attorney general, but rather a
guideline letter authored by a deputy and sent to an individual in Jerome, Idaho. The letter was
written in the context of whether cell phones were subject to the fee at the time. The answer was
no. In so answering, the author made a nodding reference to the 1989 opinion, but did nothing to
clarify it or expand upon it.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the Appellant is not a taxpayer, and therefore not
subject to the supposed relief Brewster grants. The statutory scheme has been that the fee was to
be obtained from the user of the cell phone service, not the provider of that service. If anything,
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Appellant has always been in the role of collector, the fee being passed on to the pertinent state
and local authorities.

Given that Appellant has never attempted to collect the fee, it is

inappropriate that it now attempts to stand in the shoes of the ultimate payer, and claim the
protections afforded to the ultimate payer.
Simply put, not only is the notion that Appellant be afforded taxpayer scrutiny not
"crucial" to this court's determinations of the meaning of the statute, it is not even relevant to the
analysis. This court may easily decide whether the statute in question is ambiguous or not
without affording special taxpayer status to Appellant.

D.

The District Court's Decision Was Correct that TracFone Falls Within the
Statutory Definition of Telecommunications Provider.

The pertinent portion of the statute at issue is:
(13) "Telecommunications provider" means any person providing:
(a) Exchange telephone service to a service address within this state; or
(b) Any wireless carrier providing telecommunications service to any customer
having a place of primary use within this state; or
(c) Interconnected VoIP service to any customer having a place of primary use
within this state; or
(d) A provider of any other communications service that connects an individual
having either a service address or a place of primary use within this state to an
established public safety answering point by dialing 911.
Idaho Code§ 31-4802.
TracFone, in urging this court to reverse the district court, begins by calling the court's
analysis "tortured " and "strained," and claims that the statute is "clearly inapplicable" to them.
App. Br., p.26. TracFone arrives at this conclusion by submitting the entirety of Idaho Code §
31-4802(13) to its own heavy-handed scrutiny, and then suggests that TracFone fits within the
statutory scheme as a wireless telecommunications service (LC. § 31-4802(13)(b)), even though
it simultaneously argues that subsection (b) does not apply to them. Therefore, the argument
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goes, the plain language of subsection (d) is rendered a nullity- at least as it applies to TracFone,
because it is not a form of "other" communications service. In other words, the argument is that
the provision that was designed to capture any and all wireless services that link a customer to a
PSAP (subsection (d)) does not apply to TracFone because section (b) applies, but only in a
fictional sense. Applying subsection (d) would swallow the rest of the statute, the attorneys
argue, so it must mean something other than what it says. TracFone makes no effort to state
what its view of (d) actually is other than "not a catch all" but is content to assert its point as long
as it is excluded from the fee. TracFone then asserts that this Orwellian construct is plain

so

plain that the district court not only was wrong in its findings, but unreasonable.
In beginning an analysis of TracFone's position, it is worth restating a few salient points
made by Idaho's appellate courts. Although cases abound on the subject of ambiguity as it
applies to statutory interpretation, some of the more recent Idaho cases succinctly sum up the
state of the law. First, it is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation that will not
deprive it of its potency. Hillside Landscape Construction, Inc., v. City of Lewiston, 151 Idaho
749,264 P.3d 388 (2011). Interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statutes
literal words, and where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, courts should give
effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. Only where the
language is ambiguous will a court look to rules of construction for guidance in order to consider
the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations. Stonebrook Construction, LLC, v. Chase

Home Finance, LLC, 152 Idaho 927, 277 P.3d 374 (2012). In other words, if the statute is not
ambiguous, a court does not construe it at all, it simply follows the law as written. City of

Pocatello v. Idaho, 152 Idaho 830, 275 P.3d 845 (2012), reh 'g denied.
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A statute is ambiguous when the language is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation. Kimbrough v. Idaho Board of Tax Appeals, 150 Idaho 417,347 P.3d 644 (2011).
A statute is not ambiguous merely because the parties present differing interpretations. BHC
Intermountain Hospital, Inc., v. Ada County, 150 Idaho 93,244 P.3d 237 (2010).

These more recent cases are built upon a platform of solid judicial interpretation
regarding the role of courts in statutory construction. For example, courts should avoid a result
contrary to sound sense and wise policy when construing a statute. Carrey v. Secesh Dredging,
Min. & Mill. Co., 55 Idaho 136, 39 P.2d 772 (1934). A court should give an interpretation that

will not nullify a statute, as it is presumed that the legislature did not perform the idle act of
enacting a superfluous statute. Walker v. Nationwide Financial Corp. of Idaho, 102 Idaho 266,
629 P.2d 662 (1981). A statute should not be deprived of its potency if a reasonable alternative
construction exists. State ex rel. Evans, v. Click, 102 Idaho 443,631 P.2d 614 (1981).
With that as background, it is submitted that TracFone's circular reasoning is precisely
the kind of argument this court condemned in Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center, 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502, 505 (2011) - that is, that a statute cannot mean what it

says because the result is unfortunate for the party making the argument.

The message of

Verska, which changed the world as to Idaho statutory interpretation, is loud and clear. No

longer will this court be expected to hear about unfortunate results, usually based upon arcane
arguments that a statute must mean something other than what the words clearly say. No longer
will the court brook arguments about how hard it will be to enforce the statute or that the statute
is unfair or even unreasonable. The message of Verska, in its most unalloyed form, is that
legislatures make laws, and courts follow them, no matter the content, as long as they are clear
and plain.
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What TracFone has done is seize upon the word "other" in subsection (d) as if sets up a
barrier between subsections (a), (b), or (c) in opposition to (d). TracFone fits within (b) in the
theoretical sense, it argues, and so it cannot fit within (d) because "other" applies to completely
different kinds of providers that could never fit within (b ). Therefore, to apply (d) to it would be
absurd (though TracFone does not actually use the word, substituting "tortured").
Where TracFone's argument explodes is that it fails to account for uses of the word
"other" in normal contexts. For example, "other" can mean "of like kind and character." Twin

Falls County v. Hulbert, 66 Idaho 128, 140, 156 P.2d 319 (1945), overruled on other grounds;
Hulbert v. Twin Falls County, Idaho, 327 U.S. 103 (1946).

So (d) can easily be read as: "A

provider of any communications service of like kind and character to those in subsections (a), (b)
and (c) that connects an individual having either a service address or a place of primary use
within this state to an established public safety answering point by dialing 911."
The word "other" can also mean "additional or further"; or "different from the one
mentioned." Ottawa County v. Police Officers Ass'n of Michigan, 760 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Mich.
App. 2008), citing Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1992). So (d) can easily be
read as: "A provider of any communications service in addition to those in subsections (a), (b)
and (c) that connects an individual having either a service address or a place of primary use
within this state to an established public safety answering point by dialing 911." Or, "A provider
of any communications service different from those mentioned in subsections (a), (b) and (c) that
connects an individual having either a service address or a place of primary use within this state
to an established public safety answering point by dialing 911."
These readings easily expose the frailty of TracFone's central argument - that they fit
within (b) to the exclusion of all else, and since (b) cannot apply to them, nothing can.
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The district court followed the letter and spirit of Verska.

It said in essence that if

TracFone did not fall under Idaho Code§ 3 l-4802(13)(b), then by definition it falls under (d). It
arrived at that conclusion because that is what the words of the statute say. If one does not fall
under (a), (b) or (c), and the service connects 911 callers to public safety answering points
(PSAP), one falls under (d). In so ruling, the court was completely rational and followed the
direct language of the statute, as well as accepted definitions of the word "other."
TracFone devotes a significant amount of briefing to the notion that subsection (d) is
"incomprehensible" based upon its own view of how the punctuation works in the section.
TracFone writes its view out as follows:
"Telecommunications provider" means any person providing[:] a provider of any
other communications service that connects an individual having either a service
address or a place of primary use within this state to and established public safety
answering point by dialing 911.
App. Br., p.49.

It is respectfully submitted that TracFone's construct of Idaho Code § 31-

4802(13) is only remotely understandable if one ignores the word "or" found between each of its
subsections. IAC and the counties it represents submit that the more proper way to read section
13 is as follows:
"Telecommunications provider" means any person providing: (a) Exchange
telephone service to a service address within this state; or ... (d) A provider of
any other communications service that connects an individual having either a
service address or a place of primary use within this state to an established public
safety answering point by dialing 911.
Idaho Code 31-4802(13) (emphasis added). The "or" in statutory provisions should be given its
normal disjunctive meaning, unless that meaning would result in an absurdity or produce an
unreasonable result. State v. Rivera, 131 Idaho 8, 951 P.2d 528 (Ct. App. 1998); Filer Mutual

Telephone Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 76 Idaho 256,281 P.2d 478 (1955).
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IAC submits that the above reading of the statute is not only consonant with good
grammar, it is eminently understandable.

While it may or not be perfect grammar and

punctuation, it certainly is consonant with the way reasonable people think and speak.
Ironically, after subjecting the statute to its own view of grammar by neglecting to insert
a disjunctive, TracFone asserts that this court exalts grammatical construction by citing a phrase
from Ada County Prosecuting Attorney v. 2007 Legendary Motorcycle, 154 Idaho 351, 298 P.3d
245 (2013).

This phrase, with TracFone's emphasis is "we must look to the grammatical

construction of the statute as the legislature intended the statute to be construed according to
generally accepted principles of English grammar." 154 Idaho at 354. It is submitted that what
TracFone should have focused upon was the portion it failed to underline. That is, the courts
follow grammatical construction but seek for legislative intent. This idea is best expressed by
the United States Supreme Court:
A statute's plain meaning must be enforced, of course, and the meaning of a
statute will typically heed the commands of its punctuation. But a purported plainmeaning analysis based only on punctuation is necessarily incomplete and runs
the risk of distorting a statute's true meaning. Along with punctuation, text
consists of words living "a communal existence," in Judge Learned Hand's
phrase, the meaning of each word informing the others and "all in their aggregate
tak[ing] their purport from the setting in which they are used." NLRB v.
Federbush Co., 121 F .2d 954, 957 (CA2 1941 ). Over and over we have stressed
that "[i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or
member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its
object and policy." United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122,
12 L.Ed. 1009 (1849) (quoted in more than a dozen cases, most recently Dole v.
Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 35, 110 S.Ct. 929, 934, 108 L.Ed.2d 23 (1990)); see
also King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 221, 112 S.Ct. 570, 574, 116
L.Ed.2d 578 (1991). No more than isolated words or sentences is punctuation
alone a reliable guide for discovery of a statute's meaning. Statutory construction
"is a holistic endeavor," United Savings Assn. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S.Ct. 626, 630, 98 L.Ed.2d 740
(1988), and, at a minimum, must account for a statute's full text, language as well
as punctuation, structure, and subject matter.
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US. Nat. Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 454-455
(1993).

In In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58 from Rural High School Dist. No. 1, 34

Idaho 222,200 P. 138 (1921), this court spoke to the notion of trying to overly-literalize a statute
against its clear intent.
"The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is
opposed to the intention of the Legislature apparent by the statute; and if the
words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be
adopted to effectuate that intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the
letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act." Lewis'
Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) vol. 2, § 376.
200 P. at 139. In short, a statutes manifest reason and obvious purpose should not be sacrificed
to overly literal reading. US. v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293 (1971) (if an absolutely literal
reading of a statutory provision is irreconcilably at war with the clear congressional purpose, a
less literal construction must be considered).
Even if it can be argued that the statute is ambiguous (and TracFone does), there can be
little question that the legislative intent in this matter is transparent. TracFone's argument that
the statute is "incomprehensible" because the statute might not pass muster with an English
professor is not particularly compelling. This is so because when subsection (d) is read in
isolation there can be no question whatsoever that the legislature intended to allow for the
charging of a fee in all cases where an individual has the ability to use a cell phone or similar
device to dial 911.
By ignoring the central word "or", TracFone argues that subsection (d) is so
irreconcilable with grammar and syntax that it is impossible to puzzle out the meaning of the
subsection. Therefore, the argument seems to go, the subsection should be completely ignored.
Needless to say, this is totally against sound principles of statutory construction. Since the dawn
of Idaho jurisprudence, when a court construes a statute, it has a duty to construe it in such a way
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as to be consonant with the statute's policy or obvious purpose. Parsons v. Wrble, 21 Idaho 695,
123 P. 638 (1912).

Statutes must be liberally construed to effect the objects of the statute.

Overland Company v. Utter, 44 Idaho 385, 357 P. 480 (1927). The intent of the legislature may
be implied based on language used in the statute, or inferred on grounds of policy or
reasonableness. Summers v. Dooley, 94 Idaho 87, 41 P.2d 318 (1971). The obvious legislative
intention ought to prevail as against a liberal construction of a statute, if the words used in the
statute can be given a construction effectuating that intention. In re Segregation of School Dist.

No. 58from Rural High School Dist. No. 1, 34 Idaho 222,200 P. 138 (1921). In other words, the
obvious intent of the statute should prevail as against the construction given to it by TracFone
simply because the language of subsection (d) on its face is sufficiently flexible to permit the
court to follow the clear legislative intent. See State v. Armstrong, 38 Idaho 493, 255 P. 491
(1923).
Hence, if the court finds ambiguity based upon TracFone's argument, it is still clear that
the statute may be "rescued" by simply applying legislative intent and reasonableness. In so
doing, the court will avoid nullifying the statute and avoid the result that TracFone seeks, which
theorizes that even though subsection (d) is crystal clear on its face, it must mean something else.
In so doing, the court will follow the tenets set forth in State ex rel. Evans v. Click, l 02 Idaho
443,631 P.2d 614 (1981) (a statute will not be deprived of its potency ifa reasonable alternative
construction exists).
IAC submits that subsection (d) may be easily interpreted to cover TracFone, and that
TracFone's construction (based on an assertion of awkward language) would lead to a
completely unreasonable result, a result clearly against the express words of the statute.
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TracFone devotes briefing space to the recent Kentucky case of Virgin Mobile US.A,

L.P. v. Com. ex rel Commercial Mobile Radio Serv. Telecommunications Bd., 2014 WL 4116480
(2014 ), despite the fact that the decision, as of this writing, is not final and that parties are
enjoined from citing it as authority within the courts of the state. Nevertheless, TracFone asserts
that the case demonstrates why "adherence to literal language" is appropriate. The problem with
TracFone's assertion is that the Kentucky statutory scheme is different from Idaho's, and hence
the court's holding is not particularly relevant. In Virgin Mobile the Kentucky law does not have
a similar definition to Idaho's § 3 l-4802(13)(d). In fact, the Kentucky court did not even speak
to the definition of a wireless carrier. Instead, the issue centered on whether the appellant was
capable of following the explicit Kentucky billing scheme which required that each provider:
. . . shall, as part of the provider's normal monthly billing process, collect the
CMRS service charges levied upon CMRS connections under KRS 65.7629(3)
from each CMRS connection to whom the billing provider provides CMRS. Each
billing provider shall list the CMRS service charge as a separate entry on each bill
which includes CMRS service charge.
Ky.Rev.Stat. § 65.7635(1) (emphasis added). Since the billing scheme was mandatory to all
providers, and allowed for no exceptions, the Kentucky court reasoned pre-paid providers were
not included because they did not issue "normal monthly billings."
Idaho's law is different:
The fee shall be imposed upon and collected from purchasers of access lines or
interconnected VoIP service lines with a service address or place of primary use
within the county or 911 service area on a monthly basis by all
telecommunications providers of such services. The fee may be listed as a
separate item on customers' monthly bills.
Idaho Code § 31-4804(2) (emphasis added).
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So, as can readily be seen, Idaho does not tie the provider's hands by imposing a monthly
billing requirement, and instead requires the fee to be collected by all providers. How they do it
is not spoken to and certainly not mandated.
Moreover, the issue in Virgin Mobile of whether money was owed is not before this
court. The district court specifically stated that it did not rule on the issue. R. 001034. What is
at issue before this court is whether TracFone fits within the definition of "telecommunications
provider" under an Idaho statute. Kentucky had no occasion to opine upon a similar statute, so the
Virgin Mobile case does not afford much legal help to the parties or this court.

TracFone provided to the district court a book of Idaho Emergency Communications
Commission ("IECC") minutes. TracFone did this to argue that the IECC minutes are proof of
ambiguity.

These minutes were objected to.

Assuming that the minutes are admissible as

against IAC, it is clear that the "executive construction" of the IECC (assuming such a thing
exists) is not entitled to deference.
On questions of law, a court will generally exercise free review, although administrative
agencies are sometimes entitled to deference on questions of statutory construction. Sons &
Daughters of Idaho, Inc., v. Idaho Lottery Commission, 144 Idaho 23, 156 P.3d 524 (2007).

Needless to say, courts are not bound by an agency's mistaken construction. Ada County v.
Oregon Shortline Railroad Co., 97 F .2d 666 (9 th Cir. 1938).

An agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to deference if a four (4) pronged test is
satisfied. That test is set forth in Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 208 P.3d
289 (2009). The four pronged test is as follows: (1) the agency in question must have been
entrusted with the responsibility to administer the statute (the IECC does not administer the
statute, the counties do); (2) the agency's statutory construction is reasonable (there is no

- 15 -

"agency" construction, only comments made here and there by commissioners or staff
members); (3) the court must determine if the statutory language at issue does not treat the
precise issue (the statutory language under subsection (d) does treat the precise issue); and, (4)
the court must ask whether any of the rationales underlying the rule of deference are present.

Farber, supra.
The rationales underlying the rule of deference are set forth in Farber, supra, and Farrell

v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 200 P.3d 1153 (2009). Those are: (1) a public group's reliance on
the agency's interpretation over a period of time (TracFone has not demonstrated reliance on the
IECC, it attempted to demonstrate resistance); (2) the agency's interpretation represents a
"practical" interpretation of the statute (there is no agency interpretation); (3) the legislature is
charged with knowledge of how its statutes are interpreted, and thus, when it does not alter the
statute, it presumably sanctions the agency interpretation (again, there is no agency
interpretation, therefore there is nothing for the legislature to sanction); (4) the agency's
interpretation is entitled to additional weight when it is formulated contemporaneously with the
passage of the statute at issue (there is no rule that has been formulated); and, (5) courts should
recognize and defer to the agency's expertise (there is no agency interpretation).
As can be readily seen, to the extent that TracFone attempts to make an executive
construction argument, that argument is misplaced and fails on a number of counts. What did
happen is that people here and there made comments about pre-paid cell phones. The court
correctly ruled that such comments could not and did not bind the IECC, and certainly did not
bind the counties.
One final point needs to be made. TracFone repeatedly raises the point that the counties
began by asserting that Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)(b) applied to TracFone.
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The counties

believed, and still believe, that it does. That issue is argued on cross-appeal. Once TracFone
raised the Code of Federal Regulations section relating to specialized mobile radio providers (not
spoken to in the statute), the counties countered with the thought that if subsection (b) did not
apply, then subsection (d) certainly did. This is what advocates do. TracFone has attempted to
assert that this was a shift in theory, and has even made condescending aspersions, suggesting
the counties "realized their folly" and "took a mulligan." Apparently, these statements are
offered to "prove" that the issue before the court is so complex that even the counties cannot
understand it. Alternately, perhaps TracFone is arguing the statutory scheme is ambiguous.
In reality, the only question that need be answered by this court is: is it (b), (d), both, or
neither? The counties assert that it is both. TracFone says it is neither. The court found (d), not
(b). The matter is purely an issue of law. No amount of finger pointing by TracFone as to the
path taken by the court to reach its decision is relevant. The burden is now on TracFone to
demonstrate the court was wrong. The counties submit that the court was not wrong in applying
subsection (d) to TracFone.

E.

The 2013 Bill.

In section III of its brief, TracFone makes the argument that the 2013 legislature put in
place a new method whereby the fee for prepaid cell phone providers, such as TracFone, could
be obtained (TracFone relied upon 2013 House Bill 79 ("HB 79") for its argument, then
discovered their mistake and in a separate document cites 20 I 3 House Bill 193 ("HB I 93").
Calling the 2013 bills "amendments," TracFone cites several cases to the effect that when a
statute is amended it is presumed to have a different meaning from the one that preceded it.
TracFone makes sweeping statements about the legislature's intent in passing HB 193, and
interprets that theoretical intent to mean that the legislature must have recognized that theretofore
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prepaid cellphones did not come within the statutory scheme. This assertion brings into play not
the legislative intent regarding the statute under consideration by this court, but rather a wholly
separate statute, having taken effect in January of 2014. As to this issue, it is wholly appropriate
to consider the legislative history. Because the bill cited by TracFone did not speak specifically
to the issues before this court, the court is at liberty to seek edification from the legislative
history of the bill. Webb v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 148 P.3d 1267 (2006); Adamson v. Blanchard,
13 3 Idaho 602, 990 P .2d 1213 (1999). In construing this statute, "not only must the literal
wording of the statute be examined, but also account must be taken of all other matters such as
context, object in view, evils to be remedied, history of the times and of legislation upon the
same subject, public policy, contemporaneous construction, and the like." Knight v. Employment
Sec. Agency, 88 Idaho 262,266,398 P.2d 643 (1965).
In what is a masterpiece of misdirection, TracFone devotes four pages of briefing to
suggest that the legislature specifically intended HB 193 to answer once and for all the question
about whether a fee for prepaid cell phones had been previously contemplated in the law. Of
course, TracFone answers its own question in the negative. In so doing, TracFone has ignored
the best information available on the subject, both bills' Statements of Purpose ("SOP").
Attached to this brief as Exhibit A is the actual language of the SOP to HB 79. The pertinent
portion of the SOP is as follows:
The question of whether the existing law applies to prepaid wireless service is
currently subject to pending litigation. This bill provides no inference on the
question of whether current statutes apply to prepaid wireless service.
SOP HB 79, Exhibit A.
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As is obvious, not only did the legislative sponsors not intend to make a statement on the
issue of whether its bill made a statement supporting TracFone's positon, they intended exactly
the opposite.
TracFone also originally missed the fact that HB 79 was replaced by HB 193, and that the
same language as above appeared in the SOP for that bill. (See Exhibit B, attached hereto). HB
193, as amended, was the bill the legislature passed. During the Senate hearings on HB 193, it
was represented that TracFone worked with the telecommunications industry on the bill, and was
represented in the audience, and that these entities had worked with the IECC and IAC in
finalizing the agreed upon bill before the legislature. (See Exhibit C, attached hereto).

By

definition, the legislature took no position on the issue before this court, and TracFone was
aware of that. In short, this court should not be misled into believing TracFone's assertions
about legislative intent, as the direct record demonstrates that TracFone's theories have crashed
and burned beyond all recognition.

If all this was not enough to demonstrate the fallacious arguments made by TracFone,
there is an obvious flaw in TracFone's argument, in that Idaho Code § 31-4802 (the section at
issue here) was not amended by the 2013 legislature. It will remain in place un-amended and
unremarked upon by the legislature, just has it has remained since 2007. Contrary to TracFone's
assertions, the legislature is presumed not to intend to overturn long established principles of law
unless an intention to do so plainly appears by express declaration or the language employed
admits of no other reasonable construction. McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 61 P.3d 585
(2002). Statutory amendment by implication is disfavored and will not be inferred absent clear
legislative intent. Sunshine Mining Company v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 25, 27, 684
P.2d 1002, 1004 (1984); State v. Martinez, 43 Idaho 180, 250 P. 239 (1926). In fact, what
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TracF one argues for is unconstitutional under Article III, Section 18, of the Idaho Constitution,
which states that no act may be amended unless set forth and published at full length. See Noble

v. Bragaw, 12 Idaho 265, 85 P. 903 (1906) (two or more laws relating to different parts of the
same subject matter are not necessarily amendatory to each other within the meaning of the
Constitution).
In summary, TracFone originally cited to the wrong bill, has ignored the facts, asserted
the bill amended the law when it did not, and hence cites the court to the wrong cases. Section
III of its brief should be ignored as mere surplus.
IV.
SUMMARY

The unmistakable message derived from this court's recent rulings on statutory
construction is that plain language in a statute is to be followed and that arguments based upon
obscure readings of the statute will not suffice to persuade this court to read the statute in any
fashion other than what the words actually say. TracFone has labored to build a construct of the
sole statute in question that simply cannot be reconciled with common sense or English as most
people use it. Obviously, it has a significant financial motive to try to persuade this court that
subsection (b) applies to them for the purposes of the appeal, but not as to the cross-appeal, while
simultaneously arguing that subjection (d) cannot ever apply to them. In most settings, this
would be known as "wanting it both ways." Less charitably, it could be described as taking
convenient, though contradictory, positions in order to avoid that which most objective viewers
would see as an obvious statutory scheme.
Much has been made by TracFone about the district court's comment to the effect that
the legislative drafting of the section in question was less than stellar. Nevertheless, the district
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court was able to figure out what the words meant, and applied the words accordingly. In doing
so, the district court followed the many prior holdings of this court to the effect that it is
inappropriate to ignore a statute's plain meaning in order to assuage the impact of the law on a
party. This court has stated many times that courts do not make legislation. They follow it. The
district court's decision followed this basic tenet and arrived at a thoughtful, considered result.
IAC asks this court to follow the same course in this case by upholding the well written decision
of the district court.
DATED this
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
RS21757
Current Idaho law (Chapter 48 of Title 31) authorizes counties to impose a 911 fee on purchasers
of access lines or interconnected VOIP lines with a service address or place of primary use in
Idaho. Under current law, telecommunications providers are required to collect the fee from their
customers and remit the fee to the county treasurer based on the 911 service area where the fee
is collected. However, in the case of prepaid wireless telecommunications service, customers
purchase service in advance of usage, do not have a billing address or regular periodic billing
relationship with providers, and frequently purchase service from third-party retail outlets that do
not collect address or billing information. To facilitate collection of 911 fees from purchasers of
prepaid wireless service, this legislation would require that the 911 fee be collected by the seller
at the point of sale and remitted to the Idaho Tax Commission. The fee would be administered
by the Tax Commission and funds remitted to the Commission would be transferred to the Idaho
Emergency Communications fund to be used for 911 purposes as required by law. The question of
whether the existing law applies to prepaid wireless service is currently subject to pending litigation.
This bill provides no inference on the question of whether current statutes apply to prepaid wireless
service.

FISCAL NOTE
There is no fiscal impact to the General Fund. It is estimated that this legislation could generate
up to an additional $1.6 million annually to the Idaho Emergency Communications fund for 911
purposes, after holdbacks for administration of the fee for retailers and the Idaho Tax Commission.

EXHIBIT
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
RS22041Cl
Currently Idaho law (Chapter 48 of Title 31) authorizes counties to impose a 911 fee on purchasers
of access lines or interconnected VOiP lines with a service address or place of primary use in
Idaho. Under current law, telecommunications providers are required to collect the fee from their
customers and remit the fee to the county treasurer based on the 911 service area where the fee
is collected. However, in the case of prepaid wireless telecommunications service, customers
purchase service in advance of usage, do not have a billing address or regular periodic billing
relationship with providers, and frequently purchase service from third-party retail outlets that do
not collect address or billing information. To facilitate collection of 911 fees from purchasers of
prepaid wireless service, this legislation would require that the 911 fee be collected by the seller
at the point of sale and remitted to the Idaho Tax Commission. The fee would be administered
by the Tax Commission and funds remitted to the Commission would be transferred to the Idaho
Emergency Communications Fund to be used for 911 purposes as required by law. The question of
whether the existing law applies to prepaid wireless service is currently subject to pending litigation.
This bill provides no inference on the question of whether current statutes apply to prepaid wireless
service.

FISCAL NOTE
There is no fiscal impact to the General Fund.

EXHIBIT
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section 67-429D to authorize the pursuit of the constitutionality of sections 67-429B
and 67-429C. Judge Bakes urged the Committee to approve RS 22281 since the
legislature is the only body in the state of Idaho that can defend article 111, section
20, of the Idaho constitution .

MOTION:

Senator Davis moved to send RS 22281 to print. Senator Hill seconded the
motion.
Senator Werk questioned Judge Bakes' reliance on the legislature to determine
constitutionality rather than the courts. Judge Bakes responded that there is not
a clear answer. There were two cases, one prior to Proposition One and another
following the passage of Proposition One, where the Supreme Court determined
that they had no jurisdiction . The alternative is for the legislature to enact statutes to
defend the constitution and prevent activities that violate the constitution.
Senator Werk quoted section 67-429D , "any member of the constitutional defense
council. ..will have the authority.. .to pursue a declaratory judgment," but the actual
statute indicates that decisions of the council are made by a majority vote of the
members. This seems to be conflicting. Mr. Duff said that in section 8, 67-429D,
authority is granted to any member of the defense council to pursue a declaratory
judgment action.
Senator Stennett asked who are members of the council. Mr. Duff answered
that it is the Governor, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the Attorney General. Senator Stennett asked
how the earnings, now generated by the gambling industry, would be replaced if
this passes . Mr. Duff stated that it is unclear that any revenues would be lost. The
lottery projections through 2016 show that earnings are stagnate and they need to
bring in gaming devices to increase revenues.

Senator Winder asked what was the intent of the sponsors of the bill for this
session . Mr.. Duff stated that they would like to see the legislature renew the
framework contained in section 20. This is an important item to ensure that the
constitution functions and to prevent negative impacts to the state. They would like
to see the bill move as quickly as possible.
Chairman McKenzie clarified that if the Committee moves to print, the bill may
come back but it would not be heard this session; that information has been
indicated to the sponsors.
The motion carried by voice vote.
H 193AA

Related to Prepaid Wireless Communications presented by Skip Smyser who spoke
on behalf of his client, AT&T.
Mr. Smyser explained that H 198aa has been a collaborative effort of the Idaho
telecommunications industry including AT&T, Verizon, TracFone and TMobile, all
of whom are represented in the audience. These companies have worked with
the Idaho Emergency Communications Commission (IECC) , the Idaho Sheriffs
Association , the Association of Idaho Counties and many other groups to develop
a system for the collection of a fee for the 911 service from the prepaid wireless
services segment of phone users that, today, do not pay for the 911 service; and,
to do this with a minimum of burden on the retailers.

John Cmelak, Vice President of State Tax Policy-Western Area for Verizon,
said he has worked with the State Tax Commission to develop a mechanism for
the collection of the fee. The retailer can collect the fee and send it to the Tax
Commission with their sales tax payments. The funds will be sent by the Tax
Commission to the IECC and they will make quarterly payments to the 911 service
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